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POPULATION
I do need to make some population projections as related to food supply. We don't want to get bogged down in arguments over the precision of those projections, but let us lay out some of the demographic parameters.
If world population continues to increase at its current annual rate of 90-+-million per year, the population will increase nearly a billion in the next decade. (As a reference point: In 1950, in the early stages of the Green Revolution, the average annual increase was around 30 million per year.) With a continuation of the current rate, world population would reach about 8.3 billion in the year 2025. Considering current downward trends in birth rates, the rate of growth may well decline. According to current UN projections, population will have risen from its current 5.6 billion, to at least 7.9 billion by the year 2050. However, it is possible that total population will be closer to 9.8 billion by 2050, and it could reach 11.9 billion (Vital Signs 1995) .
In another scenario, The Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development accepts a World Bank projection of 7.8 billion in 2050 but predicts zero growth at that time, and a net decline to just over 6 billion by the year 2100. The Winrock Institute foresees some major crises along the way, for example, "The population outlook for most of sub-Saharan Africa is grim; we fear that a true Malthusian disaster is brewing there." But, they continue, "we believe that one of the major forces in reducing fertility rates in developing countries is the rapid spread of modern self-images and life styles... "Thus, they continue to accept the classical demographic transition.
There is an obvious imbalance in food supplies and nutritional quality among the countries. The 1990 figures show that 66% of the children in Bangladesh were listed as underweight. The figure for India was 63%, for Tanzania, 25%, for China 21%, and for Brazil, 7%. I selected these countries as representing some of the larger national populations and the fastest rates of growth. Globally, about a billion people are undernourished. Indeed, ifpopulation does increase to 10 billion, at least 80% of that growth will be in South East Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is too early to accurately project population to the end of the next century, that is the year 2100.
However, agricultural technologists will tell you the lead time required for the effective spread of a major technological innovation in food production is on the order of 40-50 years. An example would be the widespread adoption of genetically modified crops. Thus, it is not irrational to contemplate a scenario for a population somewhere between 15 and 20 billion in 2100. If we should succeed in doubling food production in the next 50 years, to feed a population of around 10 billion, we cannot wait to the year 2050 to say, "oh-oh, we'd better start doubling it again," in other words, four times the current levels. It is clearly much more difficult to increase agricultural production than to decrease it.
Food production is one of the most complex of our economic sectors, and, given the issues of sustainability, many of its parameters for success lie beyond the reach of technology, at least technology as currently conceived. Some of the very realistic threats to sustainability may even require a technological retreat, for example global warming.
Of course, the intervening variable in these projections for population growth could be a significant increase in the death rate due to (1) starvation, (2) an environmentally-caused decline in the birth rate, (3) disease and/or (4) war. Interestingly, any of the forces that would increase the death rate would likely generate a decrease in the availability of food, at least locally.
For purposes of assessing our long-term ability to produce food, I conclude that we should consider a world population in the area of 10 billion in the middle of the next century. Without a downward change in rates, we could then have an annual growth of around 150 million.
To feed 10 billion people 50 years from now, we will need to increase food production by at least an average of 1.5% per year to maintain even current levels of nutrition. To improve nutrition, we should consider an increase of 2.5-3.0% annual increase in calories, with a concurrent increase in the quality of those calories. While we will necessarily focus on wheat, rice, corn and millet, such a focus will not solve the nutritional quality problem. However, it seems likely that the per capita consumption of meats and poultry will decline, even in the more affluent societies. This, then, is the population-food challenge.
TRENDS IN FOOD PRODUCTION
Before we consider scenarios for how food might be produced in the 21st century, we need to make an assessment of current trends in food production. This will not be an exhaustive tour of agricultural ENOUGH FOOD ON THE TABLE   203 inputs. We'll focus on some of the most significant ones. These include trends in grain production, energy supplies, arable land, water, and climate. In other words, grain production depends fundamentally on these four independent variables. There are, of course, other variables, including the significant one of public and private investment.
Perhaps the most basic indicator of our status is the trend line in world grain production. In 1950, world grain production was around 631 million metric tons. In 1994 it was 1,747 million metric tons. This is 2.8 times the 1950 base. That figure is indicative of the Green Revolution. However, since 1990 world production has leveled off at an average of about 1,700 million metric tons, with some yearto-year fluctuations due to variations in rainfall in those grain-producing regions significant enough to generate exports.
We must also examine the per capita production of grain. One concern is the impact of these declining reserve stocks given even a one-season crop failure or a series of drought years over a region, which could occur, for example in the band from Syria, through Egypt and across North Africa to Morocco or in China or in India.
The second concern is how such a decreasing reserve will affect the price of grains. The grain futures market in the US is currently reflecting the low level ofcarryover stocks. At the same time China has growing purchasing power. It is obvious that a given year's production will have an effect on the reserves, but the trend line is disturbing as one considers long-term strategies. It is also obvious that a declining reserve could stimulate more production, assuming some other major forces do not intervene.
It should be noted that the trend in production of soybeans and meat has increased fairly steadily and significantly since 1950, an improvement in nutrition, but that has occurred largely in the industrial countries and is probably a function of feed grain opportunities as much as food grains.
The Green Revolution has clearly led to increases Why is there a decline in the use of fertilizer, particularly ammonium nitrate? Price is certainly a factor. But some farmers in my state of Wisconsin are reporting that they are seeing a negative relationship between increased use of fertilizer and yields. There is also a growing resistance in the sustainable agriculture movement to chemical fertilizers, but that is still a small factor overall. Some American farmers are not using any chemical fertilizer now.
Yields per hectare usually show a decrease, but profits per hectare generally show an increase.
Looking to the future, it would appear that a doubling of food production in the next 50 years must absolutely look for alternatives to fossil fuels.
Most forecasts for petroleum (oil and natural gas) project a peak in world production sometime in the early decades of the century and a decline after that. Coal will become more important, but costs to clean up the atmosphere will increase. The forecasts on petroleum and coal assume political stability and economic structures to exploit fossil fuel reserves in such regions as the Arabian Gulf, Azerbaijan, China and North America. That is ofparticular concern to countries like Israel, where coal is imported to generate electricity.
As with forecasts of population numbers, we must guard against quibbling over the dates of such fundamental shifts in energy sources and start to phase in alternative sources of energy. There may be some very beneficial surprises ahead in that regard, at the biological level. I'll explain that a bit later. In the meantime, we are all well aware of the economic forces against presumptive shifts in the patterns of energy production and consumption. In my many discussions with Arab oil producers over the years, the central policy issue has been how to program the rate ofdepletion for petroleum, with the assumption that (1) the resource would be depleted and (2) It is possible that such trends in availability of arable land could be reversed. One obvious way, to be discussed shortly is increased irrigation. However, it seems that for increasing food supplies, it is more likely that we will seek to increase yields per hectare than increasing the amount of land. The Jordan river valley would be an example. In a modest example of recent research in the US, soil scientists are using computer imagery and computer controls to assess land quality on a micro-scale and then apply differing amounts offertilizer, water, and pesticides, as they cultivate a given field. The goal is to at least hold yields steady, but reduce the negative impacts of over-use of Green Revolution inputs.
Whether cultivation of additional lands, reclamation of damaged lands, or intensification of production, such production will be more capital intensive, and, I will argue, likely more human-labor intensive.
This raises the question of whether more of that intensification will be in the industrial countries, resulting in greatly expanded trade, or in the developing countries, or both.
Given the likely increase in fossil fuel costs for highly-industrialized agriculture, it would seem that intensification of production must come in the developing countries in a very significant way. That will necessarily be labor intensive. Industrial countries will have other menus ofissues that will distract them from huge increases in food exports, particularly if welfare grants to very poor countries are the basis of distribution.
Irrigation
Irrigation is here used as a proxy for water available to crops. Precipitation, thus rainfed agriculture, will be considered in the next sub-section on climate.
About one-third ofthe global harvest comes from the 16% of world cropland that is artificially watered. The first conclusion is that our food supplies are more reliant on rain-fed agriculture than on irrigated land. That is true, but potentially misleading, for three reasons: We may soon have some capability for predictions on medium-range climate changes. On a much longer time scale, climatologists are now advancing some of the most fascinating conclusions of any in the natural sciences in the last decade or so. While there are still arguments, there is a growing belief that glacial cycles are more periodic than episodic. That belief posits a theory that glaciation, or at least glacial climates, have occurred in 100 thousand year intervals all the way through the Pleistocene, over the last 2 million years, maybe 2.5 million years. The theory is that we are slowly, but inevitably, approaching the next period of glaciation. Movement into a glacial climate proceeds slowly and erratically, movement out tends to move more rapidly.
The latitude of Tel Aviv may be among the more sensitive regions to such monumental changes, ENOUGH FOOD ON THE TABLE   207 because it is on the boundary between the subtropical convergence of the low latitudes and the circumpolar vortex of the high latitudes. A cooling trend would bring the westerlies and the winter rains further south, even into the reaches of the Sahara. A warming trend would bring the deserts further north. Interesting stuff, and it may mean a change for the residents here a thousand years from now, or two thousand.
In the meantime, and for the next century, we have another short-term concern that is not unrelated to these millenial changes. That is the issue of global warming.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is a group of 2500 scientists that advises parties to the 1992 treaty designed to negotiate reductions in heat-trapping greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide. Their conclusion, released in September of this year, is that "the earth has entered a period of climatic change that is likely to cause widespread economic, social and environment dislocation over the next century if emissions of heat-trapping gases are not reduced."
They further conclude that "global climate change is indeed in progress and that at least some of the warming is due to human action, specifically the burning of coal, oil and wood." According to draft sections of the new forecast, some of the predicted effects of climate change may now be emerging with increasing clarity.
We'll pick out a couple that could have an impact on food production:
(1) A continuing rise in average global sea level is likely to amount to a foot and a half by the year 2100. This would inundate a series of river deltas, including such deltas as the Mississippi, the Nile, the Mekong and Yangtze, which are major agricultural areas.
(2) An increase in extremes of temperature, dryness and precipitation will likely emerge in some 
Summary of Technical Inputs
Let us now sum up this short analysis of agricultural inputs. One might conclude, from the assessment of trends, that we would be lucky to maintain food production at current levels. However, that obviously won't be adequate to serve the needs of the world's people as the population pushes upward.
Many of the optimistic agricultural futurists project an intensification of classical Green Revolution strategies. It is myjudgment that such strategies will not be adequate and in some cases will have a negative impact. There are two reasons:
(1) The As an example, and on the issue of pest control, they cite the concept of Integrated Pest Management, involving the synthesis of insect attractants that occur naturally in the insects as pheromones. These chemicals can be used to interfere with the normal reproductive cycle of common pests. Efforts are under way to modify plants to incorporate insect pheromones in the genomes of the plants.
Other geneticists are working on making plants more efficient in converting sunlight, nutrients and water into food and fiber products. Conventional plant breeding now boosts yields by roughly 1% annually. Plant breeders are working on the genetic basis of many traits, including disease and insect susceptibility, biochemical composition and nutritive value. Some optimist bio-technologists predict the ability to make new kinds of "synthetic" plants by crossbreeding, for example, converting annual grains into perennials. Others expect to engineer synthetic traits, conceived in the laboratories, directly into crop lines.
The conclusion of Plucknett and Winkelman is interesting. "Farmers will have to confront formidable challenges in learning to manage ever more advanced technologies in ways that will increase the productivity of their resources while protecting the environment. That complex goal should be within reach of richer countries, where (ironically) food is already abundant and affordable, population growth is slow and mechanisms exist for resolving at least some environmental problems associated with agriculture. But it will surely be a daunting task in the developing world, where about a billion people are being added each decade, where roughly that number are already malnourished, and where social capital for environmental protection is severely limited." In spite of that stern summary, let us proceed in our analysis. One of the most interesting research efforts revolves around the concept ofnet primary productivity. Net primary productivity is a function of solar energy at the earth's surface, and it means the amount of "surplus" carbohydrates available after plants meet their respiratory needs. The natural strategy of plants is to store next seasons's needs either in seeds or in roots. The store becomes available to animals, who have mobility to search for food, but do not have chlorophyll in their skins for primary production. Plant breeders, so far, have relied on the strategy of inducing the plant to shift its net primary production from stems, leaves and roots into fruit, including seeds. Now, there is the glimmer of an idea that we could create plants to actually increase their net primary productivity. One important variable will be the available solar energy at the surface of the leaf. Such a breakthrough would lend emphasis to technology that would shift our reliance to solar and away from fossil energy. We might call this a "blue sky idea," but the double meaning is apt. THE TABLE   211 upheaval currently on-going in the US is, at least in part, a conflict between large international enterpreneurs striving for more political order, and small businesses,, feeling pushed around and striking out for fewer regulations.
Much of agriculture falls in this category of small business. Just imagine trying to put together an effective global network of food production and distribution based on need as well as demand for a population of 10 billion. It does seem that humans strive for cooperation as a balance to competition. What we are doing is adding conscious behavior to the widespread and advantageous symbiotic behavior expressed in the natural world. This is explicated through agencies designed to distribute wealth for the general welfare, agencies to protect environmental quality, and agencies of domestic and international peace.
My judgment is that, with a human population of 10 billion in 50 years and perhaps 20 billion in 100 years, the pressure will increase greatly for an increasing commitment to cooperation. Central will be the equitable and low-cost distribution of food.
A major consequence of regional shortages without cooperation will be increasing rates ofmigration toward those areas with a combination of the best arable land base and the most sophisticated technology. Within nations, a consequence of shortages would be the radical breakdown of social structures in a downward spiral 1o a population level the local environment would support, in other words, Malthus at the local level.
Management of Resources
Part of a commitment to cooperation will require extremely careful management of resources. The classic depletion curve for stock resources will increasingly come under criticism. In the agricultural example we have seen such cooperation in attempts at fossil fuel conservation and a decreased use of chemical pesticides. Such In that regard, a breakthrough in water supply might come with cheap desalination from the oceans, with emphasis on the word cheap. ! tend to agree with the Ehrlichs that we could approach the limits set by net primary production within the next 100 years. Climate variability seems the least amenable to technological manipulation, so that climate may well be our outer limit, particularly ifwe muck up long-term trends in the process.
Population
Finally, we must return to the issue of human population. I believe that population as related to food supply is the central political issue of our time, though I'm prepared to debate the point. Some may argue that the availability of resources is openended. In that scenario, would a population of 100 billion be tenable? For others, the issue is whether and where we might level the population into a steady-state field of 10 billion or fewer. Naturalists will describe a natural population curve, characterized by exponential growth, followed by a crash, and then another slow recovery. That may be our fate.
There is much ethical debate against controlling the birth rate. The opponents to control argue for the natural process. However, there seems to be a strong consensus that we should prevent a high death rate unless we accept a kind of natural triage, one which says, in effect, you're really on your own. Yet, a varying death rate is also a natural process.
I cannot imagine a willful return to the conditions of neolithic times or paleolithic times. Thus, a central question is whether we manage populations in the patterns we have chosen to manage resources. The alternative is a climb up the staircase as we try to produce more and more food. The steepness of that staircase is driven basically by the rate of increase of population. That, in itself, doesn't seem so diabolical. But, this staircase, I
believe, has several characteristics that add to the difficulties.
First, population grows in exponential terms, as a percentage of the base, thus the steepness increases over time. While at least some argue that the curve will level off, we are most reluctant to accept an exponential decrease, which would mean death by starvation.
In modern times, there is yet no indication of an end to the climb. There is no top floor, indeed no landing on which to catch our breath.
Finally, we find ourselves riding on a kind of escalator that varies in its speed, or can even reverse direction. The variation or the reversal is due to fluctuations in production. We carefully set our goals, based on long-term projections of need. A technological discovery can help. So we can stand on one step and let new developments carry us upward. Then that technology begins to falter. Natural and economic vagaries can quite suddenly reverse the direction of the escalator, so that we must climb faster just to stay in place. If we are producing many consumer goods, such as computers, we celebrate our gains, or shrug off our losses. But this is food! You can't eat a computer.
